In the past two presidential elections, political consultants had created the conventional wisdom that the electorate was evenly divided between Democratsí and Republicansí base, and that a small group of swing voters (and states) would determine the outcome of an election. That view broke down in the election of 2000, where the outcome was decided not by swing voters but by very small margins in key states (and some Florida districts). It suffered again in the congressional elections of 2002 and recent gubernatorial elections in Kentucky and Mississippi.
In each case a highly polarized race meant that how well the base for the party turned out on election day determined the outcome. Negative campaigns, vitriolic debates, and rabid supporters meant that each contest was more focused on fervor than issues, more dependent on how well the candidateís personality withstood attacks than on policy or positions. In California, the recall of the governor succeeded despite the fact that by wide margins most Californians disagree with Arnold Schwarzenegger about environmental issues, immigration issues, gay marriage, even fiscal policy (the main issue of the campaign). Schwarzenegger, Fletcher (now governor of Kentucky), and Barbour (now governor of Mississippi) appealed to their base by virtue of their own personal identity, energizing them to turn-out on election day in numbers greater than those voters who might vote for an otherwise unappealing and familiar incumbent based on positions on issues. The ìissue votersî went to the polls in smaller numbers, or simply stayed home.
Recently, consultants have been circulating these results as the new conventional wisdom: that the presidential election of 2004 will be decided not by issues (like the war in Iraq, or jobs, etc.), but by the ability of a candidate to motivate the partyís base. This has led some to envision a winning scenario for Howard Dean, who has been the angriest and most direct in opposing Bush. It remains to be seen, however, if this wisdom will hold true for 2004, or will be just another case of campaign generals ëfighting the last war.í
12/06/2003 An article in The New Yorker called "The Great Election Grab" by Jeffry Toobin clearly outlines one of the tactical dynamics contributing to the recent focus on base, in House elections at least: "In House politics, if your district is solidly one party, your only challenge is from within that party, so you have every incentive for staying to the more extreme side of your party. If you are Republican in an all-Republican district, there is no reason to move to the center. You want to protect your base. You hear that in Congress all the time, in both partiesóëWeíve got to appeal to our base.í Itís much more likely that an incumbent will lose a primary than he will a general election. So redistricting has made Congress a more partisan, more polarized place. The American political system today is structurally geared against the center, which means that the great majority of Americans feel left out of the decision-making process.î
12/8/2003 Mickey Kaus says that the new strategy wins just by being easier to do than the alternatives: "It's mighty convenient for activists in each party to propagate the idea that swing voters are disappearing, because party activists don't want to 'develop nuanced messages aimed at' those voters--that usually means messages contradicting the party orthodoxy activists tend to embrace. Democratic cadres certainly don't want more annoying heresies like 'End welfare as we know it.' Better to focus on firing up the 'base' ... according to those in the base."